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Abstract 
 
Multi-sided platforms are increasingly common, 
which is no surprise given the winner-take-all 
dynamics in platform-based markets. That is, the 
platform with the biggest installed base of buyers and 
sellers can arguably sustain its competitive advantage 
because of positive indirect network effects. We 
reexamine this argument with an agent-based 
simulation model, where we allow for variety seeking 
and probabilistic buyer affiliation with platforms and 
interactions with sellers. Against the extant literature, 
we show that incumbency advantage is more unlikely 
to last when increasing the relative number of sellers 
to buyers on the incumbent platform. This is because 
extreme competition for buyers drives sellers and 
hence buyers, because of positive indirect network 
effects, to increasingly affiliate with the uncrowded 
entrant platform. We thus add to the literature by 
explaining how sustaining an installed base advantage 
is contingent on avoiding overcrowding a platform 
with too many sellers.   
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Firms are increasingly operating multi-sided 
platforms, where two or more different types of 
customers are connected together to interact on a 
common platform ([1], [2]). Examples include video 
game consoles, PC operating systems, credit cards, 
electronic marketplaces, social media sites, and so on 
(for more examples, see e.g., [3]–[6]). Moreover, 
operating such platforms can be highly beneficial to 
focal firm performance; for example, some of the most 
valuable firms on Earth have monetized through multi-
sided platforms (e.g., Apple with iOS, Alphabet with 
Google, Microsoft with Windows OS, Amazon.com 
with its marketplace, and Facebook with the social 
media platform). Unsurprisingly, multi-sided 
platforms are getting increasing attention from 
strategic management scholars.  
It has been argued that operating a multi-sided 
platform can result in sustained competitive advantage 
([7])—according to Van Alstyne et al. ([8], available 
online): “Firms that fail to create platforms and don’t 
learn the new rules of strategy will be unable to 
compete for long”. This proposition is based on the 
prevalence of positive indirect network effects in 
platform-based markets ([9], [10]). They imply that a 
bigger installed base of buyers and sellers to a platform 
protects it from competitive entry (see also [11], [12]). 
Thus, platform-based markets are also called winner-
take-all markets where new buyers and sellers have 
little reason to support nothing but the platform with 
the biggest installed base of existing buyers and sellers 
(see e.g., [3], [13]–[15]). 
Despite the appeal of the winner-take-all 
argument, platforms may also lose their market 
leadership completely or share the market with entrant 
platforms as observed in practice. Take for example 
the rapid fall of Symbian OS and the rise of iOS—and 
consider, on the other hand, that the other competing 
platform Android did not completely take over iOS 
either. Consequently, increasingly many scholars have 
questioned the prevalence of indirect network effects 
in explaining these unexpected and paradoxical 
market outcomes of platform competition (see e.g. [4], 
[16], [17]). 
Whereas the preceding explanations on the 
oligopolistic outcomes of platform competition have 
mostly centered on sufficient platform differentiation 
([10]), in this paper we take another view. In 
particular, we test whether an incumbent platform that 
has the monopoly initially (i.e., all buyers and sellers 
are affiliated the platform initially) will sustain its 
market leadership when an identical platform enters 
the market (e.g., with equal price and at similar 
technological quality). In other words, we seek to 
answer whether differentiating an entrant platform is 
necessary to overcome incumbency advantages. 
5275
Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2017
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/41801
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-0-2
CC-BY-NC-ND
 By using agent-based modeling ([18]), we show 
that an incumbent platform may lose its market 
leadership to an undifferentiated entrant platform. 
Specifically, the likelihood of disruption is shown to 
be positively related to the relative number of sellers 
to buyers on the incumbent platform, when assuming 
buyers are variety seeking and act probabilistically 
(see e.g., [19], [20]). Consequently, we add to the 
literature on two- or multi-sided platforms ([1], [2]), 
and platform-based markets ([4]), by elaborating on 
how overcrowding a platform with too many sellers 
can erode its competitive advantage (see e.g., [21]–
[23]). 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
2.1. Multi-sided platforms  
 
Multi-sided platforms are a novel organizational 
form, where the focal firm facilitates interactions 
between multiple types of customers affiliated with the 
platform ([2]). That is, the distinctive feature of a 
platform is that it does not directly interact with buyers 
like, say, resellers do and that are the “twin” 
organizational form to multi-sided platforms (for the 
trade-offs in choosing between the two forms, see 
[24]). Instead, a platform enables third-parties to 
directly interact with each other on the common 
platform, while capturing its share from third-party 
interactions. Third-parties may include buyers and 
sellers (but also, say, advertisers) that need to make 
platform-specific investments in order to interact (i.e., 
they affiliate with the platform; see an in-depth 
definition in [2, pp. 163–164]). To clarify, “affiliation” 
may imply paying an access fee to the platform 
whereas “interactions” between buyers and sellers 
involve transactions. Figure 1 visualizes the structure 
of a multi-sided platform.  
 
 
For example, Amazon.com can be considered as a 
multi-sided platform when it enables third-party 
sellers to directly sell to buyers, in which case 
Amazon.com charges commission fees from each 
transaction. On the other hand, Amazon.com is not a 
multi-sided platform but a reseller when it buys the 
products or services from third-party sellers and then 
sells them to buyers on its own (see e.g., [2, pp. 163–
165, 170–171], [25]). Another canonical example of a 
multi-sided platform is a video gaming console, which 
connects game developers and gamers, and these 
platforms have attracted the most attention from 
management scholars interested in multi-sided 
platforms or platform-based markets (see e.g., [4], 
[16], [17], [26], [27]). From the technological 
perspective, marketplaces like Amazon.com are 
obviously different to video game consoles—yet the 
common denominating factor for the two is the multi-
sided market structure. 
Platform-based markets are often called winner-
take-all markets, where only one platform may 
dominate and sustain its market leadership (see e.g., 
[3], [13]–[15]). This is due to the prevalence of 
positive indirect network effects ([28]–[30]); the 
number of agents on one side of a platform tends to 
positively affect platform demand on the other market 
side(s), and vice versa ([2], [27]). As Hossain et al. 
([10, p. 1913]; see also e.g., [9]) point out, “this is a 
virtuous circle with increasingly many buyers and 
sellers being attracted. This intuition, which is easily 
formalized, suggests that tipping (i.e., all players 
selecting the same platform) is an equilibrium in these 
markets.” Reflecting back on Amazon.com as an 
example, its ability to attract third-party sellers to the 
platform has likely resulted in the consumers 
substituting other resellers and platforms with 
Amazon.com, and consequently more and more sellers 
are coming on board. Thus, the installed base of buyers 
and sellers have been referred to as important and 
inimitable resources to platforms ([7], [26]), leading to 
sustained competitive advantage (i.e., that a firm can 
sustain above average performance in competition, see 
e.g., [31], [32]). 
According to the extant literature, the key to 
leveraging indirect network effects is price structure 
design ([1], [25], [33]–[35]). Simply put, aggressive 
pricing strategies that aim for subsidizing one market 
side usually result in getting them on board of the 
platform, while the other market side can be charged 
for above marginal cost prices due to indirect network 
effects, even under platform competition ([36]–[38]). 
For example, Amazon.com does not charge the buyers 
for interactions, but the sellers pay the commission 
fees.  From the perspective of an entrant platform, it 
has to arguably use penetration pricing in order to “get 
big fast” (i.e., grow the installed base of buyers and 
sellers rapidly in order to leverage network effects; see 
e.g., [3], [17]). However, entrant platforms still face 
the chicken-and-egg problem, where the sellers are 
unwilling to come on board because of the lack of 
buyers—or alternatively, buyers are unwilling to come 
Figure 1. Multi-sided platform (adapted from [2]). 
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 on board because of the lack of sellers ([39]). 
Therefore, an incumbent platform must not necessarily 
cut prices to sustain market leadership because its 
installed base advantage may be enough to mitigate 
the aggressive pricing strategies of entrants.  
In addition to pricing, platform differentiation also 
explains platform competitiveness. A platform 
differentiates primarily via the sellers; for example, 
when it comes to video game consoles, game variety 
and quality differentials between competing consoles 
explain console sales ([17], [40], [41]). Especially the 
non-technological platforms such as Amazon.com 
depend mostly on third-party sellers in differentiating 
the platform, because the other factors such as 
technological quality of the platform are basically 
irrelevant (see [4]). To clarify, in case of 
Amazon.com, buyers need not to adopt a proprietary 
technology to take use of the goods or services sold, 
unlike when adopting, say, a video game console. 
Sufficient platform differentiation may be the 
primary reason for why we are not always observing 
the winner-take-all outcome in platform-based 
markets ([9], [10]). In other words, the literature is 
rather consistent in predicting strong market 
concentration in platform-based markets, when 
platforms are undifferentiated but possess installed 
bases of different sizes. This is distinctive from 
traditional markets, where insufficient differentiation 
tends to imply average performance (see e.g., [42], 
[43]). 
 
2.2. Overcrowding and competitive advantage 
 
One concern for a platform with a big installed 
base of sellers is overcrowding—meaning there are 
too many sellers on the platform to sustain sufficient 
performance for all sellers. Despite the expectation 
that the installed base of buyers should compensate for 
the negative effect of within-platform competition on 
seller affiliation with the platform, overcrowding does 
deter further affiliation of sellers ([21]–[23]). To 
clarify, the “excess” sellers—who would be better off 
in terms of performance in affiliating with the entrant 
than the incumbent—leave the incumbent platform for 
the entrant. Thus, overcrowding limits platform 
growth and it could thus explain why no single 
platform takes over the entire market (but still the 
market would expectedly be concentrated to a degree). 
However, a consequent effect due to the excess 
sellers leaving the incumbent platform remains 
unexplored. Here, we speculate that the excess sellers 
leaving an incumbent platform may firstly trigger 
further buyer affiliation with an entrant, and thus in 
turn promoting the sellers who were better off in 
affiliating with the incumbent in the first place to 
affiliate with the entrant as well. Should these further 
sellers affiliating with the entrant platform promote 
further buyer affiliation as well, the demand growth 
for the entrant platform becomes self-sustaining. 
These self-sustaining demand dynamics could thus 
erode the installed base of buyers and sellers of the 
incumbent platform. In other words, overcrowding 
could not only explain why platform-based markets do 
not concentrate around one platform, but also the 
oligopolistic market outcomes where undifferentiated 
platforms compete head-to-head. 
Some lonely buyers or sellers need to be affiliated 
with the entrant platform initially, or that either of the 
agents were forward-looking, so that the 
aforementioned disruptive demand dynamics will be 
triggered. Forward-looking sellers could perhaps 
coordinate their support for the entrant platform in 
order to trigger buyer affiliation. However, as 
indicated in the preceding section, sellers tend to favor 
platforms with more buyers. And even if there is some 
evidence of forward-looking buyers (see e.g., [4], [9]), 
it is doubtful that they could strategically coordinate 
their support for the entrant platforms so as to trigger 
seller affiliation. On the other hand, there is some 
evidence in the literature that buyer affiliation 
precedes seller affiliation to a platform ([44]). We 
speculate that even if the buyers were not acting 
strategically when supporting an entrant platform, they 
could switch between competing platforms with 
differently sized installed bases, because they seek 
variety (see e.g., [45], [46]). Alternatively, borrowing 
from the theory of probabilistic or stochastic choice 
(see e.g., [20], [47], [48]), the installed base of sellers 
to a platform may just increase the probability of buyer 
affiliation. In other words, some buyers may 
“accidentally” choose (i.e., against their expected 
probabilistic choice) to affiliate with the entrant 
platform with the installed base disadvantage or even 
with no sellers. These accidental decisions may then 
trigger even the non-probabilistically acting sellers to 
increasingly favor the entrant platform. 
In the following, we develop an agent-based model 
with which we simulate competition between an 
incumbent platform and an entrant, and examine the 
effects of overcrowding to incumbency advantage. 
Simulation methods are especially useful here, given 
the lack of theoretical and consequently empirical 
evidence on the hypothesized disruptive dynamics. 
That is, simulation helps in solidifying our theoretical 
understanding of an unexplored phenomenon, which 
is also complex enough to necessitate more than 
purely conceptual inquiry ([49], [50]). The next 
section describes the model in detail.  
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 3. Methodology 
 
3.1. General approach 
 
We simulate competition between an incumbent 
and an entrant platform, where the incumbent has an 
installed base advantage. Given our explicit interest in 
examining the effect of overcrowding to incumbency 
advantage, it is necessary to control for the other 
potential sources of platform competitive advantage. 
Ideally, the two competing platforms would be 
identical (e.g., they charge uniform prices, and they 
are technologically similar), and that the sellers for the 
platforms are also identical (e.g., they charge uniform 
prices, and they sell similar products). Thus, the 
buyers would be indifferent to choosing between the 
competing platforms, except for that the installed base 
of sellers on a platform positively affects buyer 
affiliation. Consequently, if we were to observe that 
the incumbent platform lost its dominant market 
position to the entrant, it would necessarily be due to 
the overcrowding effect that can ideally be controlled 
exogenously (i.e., by controlling for the initial number 
of buyers and sellers on the incumbent platform).  
These aforementioned experimental conditions are 
basically impossible to arrange in real platform-based 
markets. Further, controlling for all relevant variables 
that might confound the effects of overcrowding to 
platform performance is also a non-trivial task (e.g., 
due to endogeneity arising from indirect network 
effects). Our methodological choice, agent-based 
modeling, is thus driven by the ease with which it is 
possible to set up and simulate these experimental 
conditions and thus examine an otherwise intractable 
yet an important theoretical question ([49], [50]). 
Moreover, it is necessary to use agent-based modeling 
in particular, instead of other simulation methods, 
because we assume variety seeking and probabilistic 
choices of buyers; it implies that the platform 
affiliation and seller interaction decisions of one buyer 
may differ from those of another buyer even if their 
expected choices were equal. To clarify further, it is 
especially the seller interaction decisions of buyers—
that we assume to be positively affected by the 
preceding number of buyers for sellers (the rationale 
will be discussed in the model description)—that 
necessitates simulating buyer/seller-level behavior. 
The only simulation method that can account for these 
“bottom up” demand dynamics is agent-based 
modeling, where the decisions of agents are modeled 
at the individual level instead of the aggregate level 
such as in system dynamics ([18], [51], [52]). 
                                                 
1 To clarify, here we do not subscribe to the assumptions of expected 
utility theory that assumes perfect rationality of buyers (see e.g., 
With regard to the assumptions of variety seeking 
and probabilistic choice in particular, they reflect on 
the bounded rationality of buyers, or even their 
irrationality. It has been established long ago that real 
economic agents do not conform to the behavioral 
assumptions of rational choice models, such as 
consistent preferences (see e.g., [53]). In fact, not only 
buyers but also sellers are boundedly rational in 
reality; for example, sellers may not perfectly 
anticipate the relationship between their resources and 
performance ([54]), which is also one of the grounding 
assumptions of the resource-based view ([31], [32], 
[55]). We thus assume variety seeking and 
probabilistic choice of buyers, and also that the sellers 
cannot perfectly anticipate buyer affiliation with 
platforms. However, we still presume installed base is 
the major determinant of affiliation. That is, we expect 
buyers seeking variety only to a degree, and that most 
of the time they would affiliate with the platform with 
an installed base advantage. The same goes for sellers; 
we assume they do not predict buyer affiliation, but 
they simply tend to support the platform with the 
biggest installed base as it is typically (but not always, 
as will become evident) the one offering most utility 
to them (see e.g., [22]). 
 
3.2. The model 
 
Formally, there are 𝑛𝑝 = 2 platforms, 𝑛𝑏 buyers, 
and 𝑛𝑠 sellers in the platform-based market. At each 
time step, the buyers and sellers will individually 
decide on which of the two platforms to affiliate with. 
Further, each buyer will also decide on whether and 
with which seller to interact on the platform of choice. 
Thus, buyers and sellers act at the same time when 
affiliating with a platform. After affiliation, buyers 
will also choose over the sellers on the platform, while 
the sellers do not act anymore at the time step. This 
execution structure of the model conforms largely 
those of traditional game-theoretical models. Here, the 
model will be executed repeatedly for a certain 
number of time steps, and thus the behavior of agents, 
most notably the platform affiliation decisions of 
buyers and sellers (i.e., buyer and seller market shares 
of the incumbent platform), can be observed over time. 
The buyer’s expected utility from affiliating with a 
platform or interacting with a seller corresponds to the 
probability of choosing to affiliate with the platform 
or interact with the seller.1 In other words, the 
expected utilities of buyers range from [0,1], and the 
greater the expected utility, the more likely it is that 
the buyer will affiliate with a platform or interact with 
[56], [57]). Instead, our utility formulae account for the variety 
seeking and probabilistic behavior of buyers. 
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 a seller. Given we assumed platforms and sellers were 
identical, buyer utilities can be represented as simple 
functions of the installed bases, presuming each buyer 
will choose to affiliate with a platform and possibly 
interact with a seller at each time step.2 Thus, the 
expected utilities (probabilities) 𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑃,𝑡] and 𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑆,𝑡] 
of affiliation with a platform 𝑃 and interaction with a 
seller 𝑆, respectively, to a buyer 𝐵 at time 𝑡 are 
calculated as follows: 
 
 
𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑃,𝑡] =
𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
𝑛𝑠 + 𝑛𝑝𝛽
 . 
(1) 
   
 
𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑆,𝑡] =
𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 + 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡𝛽
 . 
(2) 
 
 
The 𝛽-terms in the equations 1 and 2 represent the 
variety seeking behavior of buyers. That is, if 𝛽 = 0, 
the buyers would not affiliate with a platform with no 
preceding sellers, and also they would not interact with 
a seller with no preceding buyers (i.e., the numerators 
of the equations would always equal to zero). On the 
other hand, the preceding buyers for a platform and a 
seller do not solely determine further affiliation and 
interaction decisions of buyers either, when 𝛽 > 0. 
Then there is a chance that the buyers choose to 
affiliate with another platform and interact with 
another seller than would be expected by the preceding 
number of users for the platform/seller (i.e., 𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 
and 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1 are the number of buyers and sellers, 
respectively, on a platform 𝑃 at time 𝑡 − 1, whereas 
𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 is the number of preceding buyers for the 
seller 𝑆 on a platform 𝑃 at time 𝑡 − 1).3 For simplicity, 
we fix 𝛽 = 1 (i.e., it is a constant) in all simulations. 
                                                 
2 If a buyer affiliates with a platform and interacts with a seller at 
each time step, it effectively means that they are willing to accept, 
say, the prices of affiliation/interaction no matter what. Thus, given 
the platforms and sellers are identical in terms of pricing (and other 
aspects), the utility formulae need not to account for prices of 
affiliation/interaction and the other aspects in which the buyers are 
indifferent to choosing over platforms/sellers. However, the implicit 
assumption here is that access fees, if greater than zero, are charged 
on an ongoing basis (e.g., subscription pricing). Thus, our model is 
more representative of platforms such as Amazon.com than, say, a 
video game console where buyers need to buy the console (i.e., 
make an upfront investment that adds to the switching costs) before 
interacting with sellers. 
3 It is straightforward to verify that equation 1 sums up to 1 when 
summing over platforms (i.e., ∑ 𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑃,𝑡] = 1
𝑛𝑝
𝑝=1 ). In other words, 
the buyers will always choose to affiliate with a platform. However, 
a buyer does not necessarily interact with a seller, except for when 
the total interactions of sellers on the platform at time 𝑡 − 1 sum up 
to the number of buyers on the platform at the time (i.e., 
∑ 𝐸[𝑈𝐵𝑆,𝑡] = 1
𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡
𝑠=1 , if ∑ 𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 = 𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1
𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1
𝑠=1 ). Thus, a buyer 
does not necessarily interact with a seller at a time step, if some 
Thus, from the perspective of the incumbent platform 
that will be having an initial installed base advantage 
in the simulations, there is only a slight chance that the 
buyers would seek variety by affiliating with the 
entrant. Nevertheless, it will become evident that the 
“accidental” entrant platform affiliation decisions of 
buyers due to variety seeking and probabilistic choice 
may trigger the self-sustaining demand dynamics 
leading to the incumbent disruption—even if the 
expected market share for the incumbent was close to 
100 %, when 𝛽 = 1.4 
On the other hand, a seller makes no probabilistic 
platform affiliation decisions, yet their decisions are 
positively affected by the installed base of buyers to 
the platforms. Further, we assume that seller 
interactions with buyers are positively affected by 
their preceding interactions with buyers on a platform, 
just as if platform affiliation is positively affected by 
preceding affiliation. For example, in Amazon.com, a 
buyer can observe the other buyers’ reviews of a seller 
before making the decision to interact. Relatedly, it 
has also been shown that the provision of “superstar” 
or “hit” software is highly important to the associated 
(e.g., gaming) platforms ([16], [40], [41]). Moreover, 
we assume that sellers do not affiliate with multiple 
platforms concurrently (see e.g., [37]), and that the 
seller “reputation” due to preceding interactions with 
buyers is non-transferable between platforms. 
Whereas neither of the assumptions is likely to hold in 
reality, here they are made primarily for simplicity. 
Further, given sellers affiliate with one platform at a 
time, the assumption of non-transferable reputation is 
also more plausible because then a seller needs to 
introduce itself to a “new” audience of buyers when 
switching to another platform. Moreover, both 
assumptions favor the incumbent platform, which is 
somewhat sought after here in the sense that especially 
sellers switched platforms or if the interactions are still “building 
up” (i.e., when sellers have not interacted previously, as for example 
when a platform enters the market). 
4 It is straightforward to verify that the expected buyer (and hence 
seller) market share of the incumbent platform decreases when 𝛽 
increases. As an example, if 𝛽 = 1 and all 𝑛𝑠 = 100 sellers were 
using the incumbent platform at time 𝑡 − 1 (i.e., no sellers were 
using the entrant platform at the time), the expected buyer market 
share for the incumbent platform at time 𝑡 is 
100+1
100+2∗1
≈ 0.9901. 
Similarly, if 𝛽 = 100, then the expected buyer market share is two 
thirds. One can analytically solve 
𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1+𝛽
𝑛𝑠+𝑛𝑝𝛽
= 0.5 for β to find out 
where disruption (of the buyers’ side) of the incumbent platform is 
expected—for example, if 𝑛𝑝 = 2, it should be that 𝛽 =
1
2
∗𝑛𝑠−𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1
1−
1
2
∗𝑛𝑝
=
1
2
∗𝑛𝑠−𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1
1−
1
2
∗2
→ ∞, if the incumbent platform was 
expectedly to be disrupted on the byers’ side of the platform at time 
𝑡. Note that the formulation of equation 1 also explains why the 
incumbent platform does not take over the entire market of buyers 
initially, when the number of sellers on the platform is relatively low 
(see the left hand side contour plots in Figure 2). 
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 in such hypothetical market conditions we would 
expect the incumbency advantage to last (i.e., 
disproving this presumption would then be a strong 
result). Finally, we assume that the sellers can 
anticipate their interactions with buyers on a platform, 
yet they cannot anticipate the number of buyers on the 
platform. These latter assumptions are plausible in the 
sense that sellers are more likely to anticipate their 
own interactions than those of platforms (other than 
retrospectively; see e.g., [22]). Also, given the implicit 
assumption in the literature is that sellers cannot 
coordinate their platform affiliation—but rather they 
tend to be affiliated with the platform with the biggest 
installed base of buyers, other things being equal—it 
is even more expected that the sellers cannot anticipate 
demand for the platforms.  
Therefore, a seller chooses to affiliate with the 
platform maximizing the following expected utility 
formula (i.e., equation 3). We define the expected 
utility 𝐸[𝑈𝑆𝑃,𝑡] of a platform 𝑃 to a seller 𝑆 at time 𝑡 
as follows: 5 
 
 𝐸[𝑈𝑆𝑃,𝑡]
=  𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 ∗
𝑛𝑏𝑝𝑆,𝑡−1 + 𝛽
𝑛𝑏𝑃,𝑡−1 + 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1𝛽
 . 
(3) 
 
Finally, we impose all buyers and sellers to 
affiliate with the incumbent platform (𝑝 = 1) at time 
𝑡 = 0. Then, from time 𝑡 = 1 onwards, competition 
between the incumbent platform and the entrant (𝑝 =
2) is simulated endogenously. The number of buyers 
and sellers in the market are also controlled for 
exogenously in the simulations—that is, 𝑛𝑏 =
[1000, 2000, 3000, 4000, 5000], and 𝑛𝑠 =
[1,2,3, … , 99,100], respectively. Due to the stochastic 
nature of the model, for each parameterization it will 
be simulated for 1000 iterations. In each iteration we 
collect the market share data for every 250th time step 
(i.e., at times 𝑡 = [0,250,500, … ]), and stop 
simulations at time 𝑡 = 5000. 
All in all, the present model is arguably very 
simplistic, while still capturing the essentials of buyer 
and seller affiliation/interaction processes (i.e., direct 
and indirect network effects). It enables us to easily 
                                                 
5 Note that the second term in the equation 3 corresponds largely to 
the utility formula of buyers (i.e., equation 2). However, the sellers’ 
anticipation of future sellers on a platform (i.e., 𝑛𝑠𝑃,𝑡−1) is based on 
the preceding number of sellers on the platform, whereas the buyers 
observe the actual number of the sellers on the platform after 
platform affiliation. 
6 The model was implemented in AnyLogic 7.1.2 
(www.anylogic.com). 
7 Here, any sustained market share difference in favor of the 
incumbent platform implies its competitive advantage. The 
confidence intervals were calculated based on the non-parametric 
evaluate the effects of overcrowding to incumbent 
platform competitive advantage by varying the 
number of buyers and sellers on the platform and 
observing the resulting market share outcomes over 
time. Note that there is no predetermined ratio of 
sellers to buyers on a platform that implies 
overcrowding—instead, overcrowding emerges 
endogenously in the model, or not. We will see 
whether it does in the following section.6 
 
4. Results  
 
To evaluate the effects of overcrowding to the 
sustained competitive advantage of the incumbent 
platform, Figure 2 indicates the median buyer and 
seller market shares of the incumbent platform with 
respect to the number of buyers and sellers in the 
market (or alternatively, on the incumbent platform, as 
all buyers and sellers affiliate with it initially), and also 
with respect to time. Note that each subplot is 3-
dimensional, where the contours represent the market 
shares of the incumbent platform with respect to the 
parameters. To clarify, the upper left and right contour 
plots in Figure 2 represent the median buyer and seller 
market shares respectively and at time 𝑡 = 5000 (i.e., 
at the last simulated time step). Analogously, the lower 
left and right contour plots represent the buyer and 
seller market shares respectively and over time, when 
the number of buyers in the market 𝑛𝑏 = 1000.  
Most notably, the hatched areas in each contour 
plot (Figure 2) indicate the range of parameters where 
disruption of the incumbent platform is observed. In 
other words, in these areas, the lower bound of the 
confidence interval (at 𝛾 = 0.95 confidence level) for 
the median market share in either side of the 
incumbent platform is equal to or lower than 50 %.7  
One can easily see from the upper left and right 
contour plots (Figure 2) that the incumbent platform is 
more likely to lose its market leadership until the time 
𝑡 = 5000, when the relative number of sellers to 
buyers in the market increases. For example, when 
𝑛𝑏 = 1000, the incumbent platform loses its market 
leadership approximately when 𝑛𝑠 > 20 until the time 
𝑡 = 5000. The pace of disruption is also positively 
bootstrap using 1000 bootstrap samples. Bootstrapped estimates 
tend to be asymptotically consistent and unbiased regardless of the 
underlying distribution of data ([58]), which is very useful because 
simulation models can easily produce non-normally distributed data 
(this is also the reason for measuring the median market shares 
instead of means) ([59]). Further, it is practically impossible to 
check for the distribution of data in each of the many 
parameterizations, and hence bootstrapping is basically a panacea in 
analyzing stochastic simulation data. 
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 related to the relative number of sellers to buyers in the 
market (lower left and right contour plots). For 
example, when 𝑛𝑏 = 1000 and 𝑛𝑠 = 100, the two 
platforms tend to share the buyers and sellers equally 
approximately when 𝑡 > 500. One can also see from 
the left and right hand side contour plots that the 
disruption occurs rather uniformly on both sides of the 
platform.  
Thus, it seems that the random events where some 
buyers “accidentally” affiliate with the entrant 
platform (i.e., against their expected probabilistic 
choice) are more likely to trigger further buyer and 
seller affiliation, leading to the self-sustaining 
disruptive demand dynamics, when the incumbent 
platform is overcrowded with too many sellers. In 
other words, the accidental affiliation of buyers is 
significantly more unlikely to trigger the self-
sustaining disruptive demand dynamics, when the 
relative number of sellers to buyers on the incumbent 
platform stays at a relatively low level.8 
 
 
                                                 
8 In fact, if the simulation model is run for long enough (e.g., tens or 
hundreds of thousands of time steps), the disruption seems to occur 
eventually, no matter what. However, it does not invalidate the 
aforementioned results, as it only tells us that the unlikely events can 
5. Discussion 
 
5.1. Theoretical implications 
 
Multi-sided platforms are increasingly prevalent, 
and some of the most valuable firms on Earth (e.g., 
Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon.com, and 
Facebook) operate them. This might not be a 
coincidence as platform-based markets are arguably 
characterized of winner-take-all dynamics. That is, the 
platform with the biggest installed base of buyers and 
sellers should sustain market leadership and basically 
take over the entire market, because of the prevalence 
of positive indirect network effects in platform-based 
markets ([9], [10], [13]–[15]). Thus, multi-sided 
platforms are becoming the next major organizational 
form of interest to strategic management scholars 
seeking to explain sustained competitive advantage 
([1]–[4], [8]). Despite their appeal, however, several 
empirical examples illustrate how platforms cannot 
sustain their market leadership or how multiple 
platforms can compete head-to-head in platform-based 
happen eventually. Due to computational limitations, we did not 
simulate the entire parameter space for a longer period of time than 
what was presented above. The present observation was based on 
test simulations with some selected parameters.  
Figure 2. Median buyer (left) and seller (right) market shares of the incumbent platform with respect to the 
number of buyers and sellers in the market (upper), and with respect to time (lower). The hatched areas 
indicate the range of parameters where disruption of the incumbent platform is observed. 
 
 
 
5281
 markets. Thus, the intuitively sound winner-take-all 
argument is clearly lacking in empirical validity.  
In this paper, we joined the critiques who have 
questioned the installed base of buyers and sellers to a 
platform being strategic resources, explaining 
sustained competitive advantage ([7], [31], [32]). 
Whereas the preceding explanations on the 
oligopolistic outcomes of platform competition have 
mostly centered on sufficient platform differentiation 
(see e.g., [4], [16], [17], [40]), we took another view, 
however. We were particularly interested in exploring 
whether an incumbent platform with an installed base 
advantage may lose its market leadership to an entrant 
that has no preceding users and is completely 
undifferentiated from the former. By using agent-
based modeling ([18]), we showed that random and 
unlikely events may trigger the self-sustaining demand 
dynamics that lead to the erosion of incumbent 
platform competitive advantage due to indirect 
network effects. Importantly, we showed how the 
likelihood of the disruptive demand dynamics being 
triggered is positively related to the relative number of 
sellers to buyers on the incumbent platform.  
We thus add to the literature on two- or multi-sided 
platforms ([1], [2]), and platform-based markets ([4]), 
by illustrating how the sustained competitive 
advantage of a platform due to indirect network effects 
is contingent on avoiding overcrowding. 
Overcrowding occurs when there are too many sellers 
on a platform to sustain sufficient performance for all. 
To the best of our knowledge—even if the extant 
literature acknowledges within-platform competition 
is detrimental to platform performance in the sense 
that it deters further seller affiliation ([21]–[23])—
there are no existing studies explicating how 
overcrowding can trigger the disruptive competitive 
dynamics from the incumbent platform’s perspective. 
By showing that the installed base advantage can 
erode “itself”—in other words, sellers may 
increasingly exit an overcrowded platform when more 
favorable platform options are available—we thus 
offer an important contribution to the literature that 
tends to picture the installed base as an inimitable and 
hence as a strategic resource to platforms ([7], [31], 
[32]). All in all, our results suggest that the 
oligopolistic outcomes of platform competition may 
simply be attributable to the lack of differentiation 
between platforms (see also e.g., [16]). In other words, 
sufficient platform differentiation may not be needed 
to overcome installed base advantages, as the sellers 
might naturally support an undifferentiated entrant 
platform in order to mitigate the direct negative 
network effects (i.e., within-platform competition). 
Importantly, even if we assumed variety seeking 
(see e.g., [19], [45], [46]) and probabilistic platform 
affiliation and seller interaction decisions of buyers 
(see e.g., [20], [47], [48]), it does not imply that the 
market outcomes would be random as well. That is, 
the “accidental” (i.e., unexpected) entrant platform 
affiliation decisions of buyers were significantly more 
unlikely to trigger the self-sustaining disruptive 
demand dynamics in the simulations, when the relative 
number of sellers to buyers on the incumbent platform 
was sufficiently low. Thus, there is some validity to 
the winner-take-all argument. However, given the 
prevalence of positive indirect network effects that the 
winner-take-all argument builds on, more and more 
sellers should affiliate with the “winners”. It is thus a 
theoretically intriguing (yet practically devastating) 
idea that positive indirect network effects may 
eventually drive the winners to become “too big to 
fail”, no matter what, thus eroding their installed base 
advantage.  
 
5.2. Managerial implications 
 
The simple message of this research to 
practitioners is that overcrowding a platform with too 
many sellers should be avoided, or more generally that 
platforms should not exert their monopoly power over 
sellers “in full” (see e.g., [37]), because otherwise 
platform competitiveness may be hurt. Avoiding 
overcrowding is essentially about balancing the 
number of agents on each side of the platform, so that 
the sellers can enjoy sufficient performance and thus 
remain affiliated with the platform. One way to do this 
is to ensure platform growth on both sides of the 
platform. However, this may be hard in practice—if 
we think of the most valuable platforms today, such as 
Apple’s iOS, the industry sources have indeed 
reported that the “gold rush” is over and sellers face 
intense competition on the platform. We would thus 
expect some sellers withdrawing from iOS to 
competing platforms, where competition is not so 
extreme—one possible explanation to the success of 
Android is that competition among sellers is not as 
extreme on the platform as it is on iOS. In these cases, 
restricting platform growth may be required to balance 
the market sides of the platform.  
While we have not examined the strategies of 
platform owners to prevent overcrowding, there may 
be some. For example, platform owners could increase 
prices to sellers in order to deter further entry to the 
platform (i.e., to deter within-platform competition). 
However, such a strategy is risky, because then the 
entrant platforms may more easily utilize, say, 
penetration pricing to overcome incumbency 
advantages. Another strategy, as pursued by Apple, 
may be to adopt strict quality standards for sellers. 
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 This strategy may also enable platform differentiation 
in terms of quality. 
 
5.3. Limitations and future research 
 
There are some limitations in the present study. 
First, the agent-based model is highly simplistic, thus 
limiting the generalizability of results. For example, 
disruption due to overcrowding may be less common 
when platform switching costs are high as they were 
now basically ignored in the model. Thus, future 
research may empirically validate the theoretical 
findings and explore boundary conditions. 
Second, we assumed buyers were seeking variety 
and choosing probabilistically between competing 
platforms and sellers. Should the reader accept these 
assumptions, they are not a limitation, however (see 
e.g., [53]). Nevertheless, it would still be interesting in 
the future research to explore whether the disruptive 
demand dynamics due to overcrowding occur in a 
deterministic world where buyers are rational. In 
particular, one could elaborate on the conditions when 
the forward-looking behavior of buyers (and/or 
sellers) could make them strategically support entrant 
platforms.  
Moreover, we did not allow for the platforms to 
adapt to the changing market conditions in terms of, 
say, pricing. One could thus expand the analysis to 
account for and analyze the effectiveness of strategies 
(e.g., pricing) that platforms can use to counteract 
seller exits and hence the disruptive demand 
dynamics. Finally and relatedly, we imposed 
overcrowding by controlling for the number of buyers 
and sellers on the incumbent platform exogenously. 
One could instead endogenously model the entry of 
sellers to the platforms in order to understand what 
drives overcrowding and evaluate the platform 
strategies to prevent it in the first place. 
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